Inside the Luxurious World of Mexico's Supreme Court

In Mexico, a simmering debate over the privileges and responsibilities of the nation’s judiciary has erupted into a full-blown controversy. At the heart of the issue lies the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN), whose ministers have come under scrutiny for their generous salaries, extensive perks, and perceived resistance to austerity measures that have defined the country’s political landscape in recent years.

The conflict highlights a deeper tension between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, exposing allegations of systemic corruption, inefficiency, and resistance to reform. Critics argue that these privileges not only erode public trust but also compromise the integrity of the judiciary, raising questions about the role of accountability in a branch of government often shielded from public scrutiny.

The debate began with revelations of the Supreme Court ministers' earnings and benefits, figures that starkly contrast with the austerity policies implemented by President Andrés Manuel López Obrador's administration. Since taking office, López Obrador has championed frugality in public service, instituting a constitutional mandate that no public servant earn more than the president, whose monthly salary is capped at approximately 130,000 pesos (approximately USD 6,378.81).

In stark contrast, Supreme Court ministers reportedly earn upwards of 700,000 pesos monthly (around USD 34,232.45), a figure that includes base salary and allowances. Beyond this, the ministers enjoy a suite of perks: a restaurant fund of over 720,000 pesos annually, access to a private dining room with a menu that includes alcoholic beverages, and the use of armored vehicles valued at 6 million pesos, renewed every two years. Health insurance for the ministers and their families costs taxpayers 30 million pesos annually, while individualized separation insurance provides a payout of approximately 20 million pesos after 15 years of service.

Ricardo Monreal Ávila, a senator and prominent critic, presented these figures in a Senate session on May 9, 2023, listing some 40 privileges authorized by the ministers themselves. These revelations struck a nerve in a nation where public servants are often viewed with suspicion, and where demands for transparency and fairness have grown louder.

The controversy extends beyond financial perks. Critics, including members of the López Obrador administration, have accused the judiciary of perpetuating systemic corruption. A report by Luis Rodríguez Bucio, Undersecretary of Public Security, detailed instances where judges allegedly facilitated impunity for individuals accused of serious crimes, including drug trafficking, human trafficking, and organized crime.

According to Rodríguez Bucio, judges routinely issued rulings that impeded justice, such as declaring arrests illegal, reclassifying serious charges to lesser offenses, or acquitting defendants. These decisions, he argued, reflect not isolated incidents but a troubling pattern of behavior that undermines public safety and trust in the legal system.

Tax-related cases have also come under scrutiny. Félix Arturo Medina Padilla, a former Federal Attorney General, reported that judges have obstructed the prosecution of major tax evaders, delaying or halting trials involving approximately 80 billion pesos in unpaid taxes. Medina characterized these actions as part of a broader pattern of collusion between the judiciary and powerful interests, resulting in what he described as a “systemic corruption” that promotes impunity.

The judiciary’s critics argue that inefficiency compounds these issues. According to Deputy Monreal, the system suffers from a backlog of cases that leaves 75% unresolved. An estimated 85% of prisoners have yet to receive sentencing, with the average case taking seven years to conclude. Monreal further noted the prohibitive cost of seeking justice: administrative cases cost litigants an average of 7,000 pesos, family cases 70,000 pesos, and criminal cases as much as 700,000 pesos.

These statistics underscore the perception that the judiciary is both out of reach for ordinary citizens and insulated from accountability. Despite their high salaries, Mexico’s judges rank among the least effective globally, Monreal argued, a situation that fuels frustration among a public already skeptical of government institutions.

The tensions surrounding the judiciary reflect broader struggles over Mexico’s political future. López Obrador’s administration has framed the judiciary as resistant to change, accusing it of prioritizing privilege over public service. The Court’s refusal to comply with the constitutional austerity mandate, combined with its opposition to proposed reforms requiring ministers to leave office and stand for election, has deepened this perception.

For their part, the judiciary has defended its independence, arguing that attempts to reduce salaries or alter tenure protections threaten the separation of powers enshrined in Mexico’s constitution. However, this defense has done little to assuage public anger over the perceived disconnect between the judiciary’s privileges and its performance.

Judges Face the Axe in Mexican Legal Reform

As Mexico advances its reforms of the Judicial Branch of the Federation, questions about the fate of circuit magistrates and district judges have come into sharp focus. Under the provisions of the constitutional reforms promulgated in the Official Gazette of the Federation on September 15, 2024, the conditions for judicial turnover and compensation have been meticulously outlined. These changes are poised to reshape the landscape of the judiciary while addressing concerns over labor rights, funding, and the mechanisms for ensuring a smooth transition.

One of the key aspects of the reform is the process governing the departure of circuit magistrates and district judges. Judges who opt not to seek re-election or fail to secure public approval in the elections scheduled for June 1, 2025, will receive compensation in accordance with legal stipulations. The Tenth Transitory Article of the reform decree emphasizes the safeguarding of labor rights for judicial workers, ensuring that they remain unaffected despite the institutional changes.

The decree provides clarity on compensation:

• Judges concluding their service will be entitled to an amount equivalent to three months of integrated salary.
• They will also receive an additional payment of 20 days of salary for every year of service rendered.
• All other benefits to which they are legally entitled will be honored.

The comprehensive nature of this compensation package reflects a commitment to fairness while facilitating the judiciary’s transition to a new operational framework. Central to the reform is a guarantee that the labor rights of judicial branch employees at both federal and state levels will be fully respected. The reform mandates that annual expenditure budgets account for:

• Complementary pensions, ensuring long-term security for retiring judicial workers.
• Medical support, addressing the health needs of former employees.
• Other labor obligations, as outlined in existing laws or working conditions agreements.

This provision underscores the government’s effort to strike a balance between transformative reform and continuity of care for the individuals impacted by these changes. The financial resources required to implement these measures will come from a restructuring of the judiciary’s existing financial instruments. According to the decree, all funds, trusts, mandates, or similar contracts not explicitly provided for under secondary law will be liquidated.

The process entails:

1. Extinguishing funds and trusts: Within 90 calendar days of the decree’s entry into force, judicial entities must dissolve any financial instruments that lack secondary law provisions.
2. Redirecting resources: The remaining balances, including accrued interest and benefits, will be transferred to the Treasury of the Federation or the relevant state treasury.

By drawing on these resources, the reform ensures that compensation obligations can be met without imposing undue strain on the federal budget. An unprecedented aspect of the reform is the introduction of elections to determine the continuance of judicial officials. For judges and magistrates, the process involves standing for public approval, a move aimed at increasing accountability and aligning the judiciary more closely with democratic principles.

Judges who choose not to contest or fail to secure a mandate will step down, triggering the aforementioned compensation process. This electoral mechanism, though controversial, seeks to bridge the gap between the judiciary and public expectations for transparency and fairness.

Moreover, the funding mechanism, which involves dissolving trusts and similar financial vehicles, raises concerns about the adequacy of resources for future judicial initiatives. Ensuring that the judiciary remains effective and well-resourced in the long term will be a critical challenge for policymakers.

A Bench of the People, By the People, For the People

A constitutional reform to Article 96 has reimagined the selection process for the country’s most senior judicial officials. Under the new framework, citizens will directly elect Supreme Court ministers, magistrates of the Superior and Regional Chambers of the Electoral Tribunal, members of the Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal, Circuit magistrates, and District judges. This unprecedented move brings the judiciary closer to public accountability, but not without raising questions about the implications for judicial independence and the integrity of Mexico’s legal system.

Historically, the appointment of judicial officials in Mexico has been the purview of the executive and legislative branches, a process often criticized for lacking transparency and for fostering political favoritism. With the constitutional reform to Article 96, this dynamic changes dramatically. Citizens will now elect judges and magistrates in a free, direct, and secret vote, coinciding with ordinary federal elections.

The first such elections are set for Sunday, June 1, 2025. The reform introduces an intricate procedure for nominating, evaluating, and electing candidates, aiming to balance transparency, meritocracy, and democratic participation.

The process begins with the Senate of the Republic, which is tasked with issuing a call for candidates. This must occur within 30 days after the first ordinary session of the year preceding the election. The call will detail the complete stages of the process, including non-extendable deadlines, the number of positions available, and specific criteria such as judicial circuit specialization.

To ensure transparency and merit-based selection, each branch of the Union will establish an Evaluation Committee. These committees, comprising five individuals recognized for their legal expertise, will:

• Receive and review applicants’ files.
• Verify that candidates meet constitutional and legal requirements.
• Assess candidates’ technical knowledge, honesty, public reputation, competence, and professional background.

After evaluating applicants, the committees will rank the candidates based on their qualifications. For ministerial positions in the Supreme Court, as well as magistrates in the Superior and Regional Chambers of the Electoral Tribunal and the Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal, the committees will identify the ten best candidates per position. For Circuit magistrates and District judges, the number is six.

In a move to ensure fairness, gender parity, and impartiality, the committees will refine these lists through a public lottery to determine the final slate of candidates. These finalized lists will then be submitted to the Senate of the Republic by the respective branches of the Union for approval and forwarding to the National Electoral Institute (INE).

Once the INE receives the approved candidate lists—no later than February 12 of the election year—it assumes responsibility for organizing the elections. The INE will oversee the voting process, counting of ballots, and certification of results.

For positions like Supreme Court ministers and members of the Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal, elections will be conducted at the national level. Meanwhile, for Circuit magistrates and District judges, elections will be held within their respective judicial circuits, which correspond to Mexico’s 32 states.

After the elections, the INE will send the results to the Superior Chamber of the Electoral Tribunal or the Supreme Court’s plenary session, depending on the position. These bodies will resolve any challenges to the results before submitting them to the Senate, which will swear in the newly elected officials during its first ordinary session on September 1.

While proponents argue that this reform democratizes the judiciary and strengthens its accountability to the public, critics warn of potential pitfalls. By subjecting judges to elections, there is a risk that judicial independence—a cornerstone of a functioning democracy—could be compromised.

Judges may face pressure to align decisions with popular opinion rather than strict legal interpretation, especially in high-profile cases. The involvement of political parties and campaign financing could further erode the impartiality expected of judicial officers.

Additionally, the public’s ability to assess judicial candidates based on merit rather than political or populist narratives remains an open question. Judicial qualifications are often highly technical, making it challenging for voters to evaluate candidates comprehensively.

Despite these concerns, the reform presents opportunities for increased transparency and public trust in the judiciary. By empowering citizens to participate directly in the selection process, the reform seeks to address long-standing criticisms of opacity and elitism in judicial appointments.

The introduction of evaluation committees, public lotteries, and gender parity measures reflects an effort to maintain fairness and meritocracy within this new electoral framework. Furthermore, aligning elections with federal voting schedules may encourage higher voter turnout and engagement.

The Nominations Process

Mexico’s constitutional reform to Article 96 introduces a complex and highly collaborative process for nominating candidates to the country’s most senior judicial positions. This reform, which entrusts citizens with the power to directly elect Supreme Court ministers, Electoral Tribunal magistrates, and members of the Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal, sets detailed guidelines on how each branch of government will nominate candidates for these pivotal roles.

The reform seeks to balance the influence of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches in shaping the judiciary while implementing strict rules to ensure fairness, transparency, and independence in the electoral process.

Supreme Court Ministers, Electoral Tribunal Magistrates, and Disciplinary Tribunal Members

For these high-profile positions, nominations will emerge from a collaborative process involving all three branches of the Union.

• The President of the Republic: Will nominate up to three candidates for each position.
• The Legislative Branch:
  • The Chamber of Deputies will nominate one candidate, selected by a qualified majority of two-thirds of its members present.
  • The Senate of the Republic will nominate two additional candidates, also requiring a two-thirds majority vote.
• The Judicial Branch: The Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN) will nominate three candidates through its plenary session, requiring a majority vote of at least six of its ministers.

This structure ensures a broad representation of interests, with the inclusion of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches in the selection process, reflecting the reform’s aim to democratize judicial governance.

Circuit Magistrates and District Judges

For these positions, which encompass more localized judicial responsibilities, the nomination process involves similar principles of balance:

• The President of the Republic: Can nominate up to two candidates for each position.
• The Legislative Branch:
  • Both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate will each nominate one candidate, requiring a two-thirds majority vote in their respective chambers.
• The Judicial Branch: The SCJN will nominate two candidates for each position, based on a majority vote of at least six of its members.

In a unique provision, current Circuit magistrates and District judges may also be added to the candidate lists by the Senate of the Republic. This addition applies unless they choose to decline participation, are nominated for a different judicial position, or transfer to another judicial circuit.

Campaigning Under New Rules

The reforms introduce strict guidelines to regulate the campaign process, reflecting a focus on equity and impartiality:

1. Access to Media: Candidates will have access to official radio and television time to communicate their qualifications and judicial philosophies to the public.
2. Debate Forums: Public debates will allow candidates to present their views, providing voters with insights into their judicial priorities and expertise.
3. Ban on Political or Financial Support:
   • Candidates are prohibited from receiving public or private financing for their campaigns.
   • Political parties and public servants are barred from offering any support in their proselytizing activities, ensuring that the process remains free of undue political influence.

This tightly regulated campaign framework underscores the reform’s commitment to preserving judicial independence while enabling public participation in the electoral process.

While the reform attempts to ensure fair representation from all three branches of government, critics argue that the potential for political influence remains. The President’s ability to nominate up to three candidates for senior judicial positions raises concerns about the concentration of power in the Executive Branch. However, the requirement for a two-thirds majority in the Legislative Branch introduces a significant check, compelling collaboration and consensus across political lines.

The prohibition on external funding and political support is critical for maintaining the impartiality of judicial candidates. However, ensuring compliance with these rules will require robust oversight mechanisms. The reliance on official media time and debate forums, while promoting transparency, may not suffice to level the playing field if enforcement of restrictions on external influences proves inadequate.

The introduction of public participation in the judiciary’s selection process is both its greatest strength and its most significant challenge. Educating voters on the technical and professional qualifications of candidates will be essential for informed decision-making. Without this, elections risk becoming popularity contests, undermining the judiciary’s credibility.

The success of these reforms will depend on careful implementation and oversight, particularly in enforcing campaign rules and fostering an informed electorate. Whether this bold experiment in democratizing the judiciary enhances public trust or introduces new vulnerabilities remains to be seen.

In-text Citation: (Bahena, 2024, pp. 16-19)